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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
A central problem in corporate governance is to explain why rms are organised in the way
they are. As Hansmann (1996) shows there are a wide range of rms in reality. These
range from the small single owner/manager rm, through large corporations with separated
shareholders, bondholders, boards and managers, to worker cooperatives, professional part-
nerships and hybrid organizations, which include non-prots such as hospitals, charitable
organizations, schools and universities. From his discussion of the rm, he characterizes the
myriad organizations that have evolved to deal with a wide range of organizational problems.
In particular these arise where agents interact strategically in producing complex commodi-
ties or services. Factors such as the degree of competition in product and input markets and
the presence of asymmetric information have an inuence on the nature of the rm.
Hansmann (1996) cites a number of examples where rms are owned either by those
who purchase their outputs or those who supply inputs to the rm. He argues that, in most
cases, this is to counter monopoly or monopsony power. This practice is very common
among rms, which supply inputs to or buy produce from farms. (See also Refsell (1914).)
In relatively remote rural areas, it is easier to establish a local monopoly. Likewise lawyers
and accountants usually organise as partnerships. The reason for this is similar. The rm
is a monopoly supplier of inputs which these people need to work. Partnerships reduce the
monopoly distortion.
In the present paper we consider how imperfect competition interacts with the objective
function of the rm. For example, consider the labour market where rms hire specialised
labour that is industry- and/or rm-specic. Our model allows a rm to take into account
the strategic effect of hiring the particular type of labour on the reaction of other rms in the
industry. In particular a non-prot rm can pursue a more aggressive strategy in the labour
market at the expense of prot maximising rivals. Similar considerations apply if there is
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imperfect competition in the product market.
1.2 Modelling Firm's Decisions
In this paper, we consider an economy with monopoly or oligopoly. As we shall argue, there
is a strong case against assuming prot maximisation when markets are distorted. However,
it is not clear what the alternative should be. We model the rm as a collection of individuals,
each of whom is maximising his/her utility. Decisions are made by a process of aggregating
the preferences of a group of agents within the rm.1
One approach, which has been used in the past, is to model decisions as being made by
a majority vote of shareholders.2 However one can object to shareholder voting models by
arguing that, in practice, management have more inuence than shareholders. To model this,
we assume that the rm's decisions are made by a group of individuals, which we shall refer
to as the control group. For example, the control group could consist of the shareholders
and senior management. As another example, consider a rm with no shareholders, but is a
partnership. This case is common in legal, accounting, nance and professional rms, where
the rm produces services that are a function of human capital, individual and team effort.
However, to preserve generality, we shall not explicitly describe the criteria for membership
of the control group.
At present there is no widely accepted theory of the internal structure of the rm3 For this
reason we use an abstract model. We make, what we believe to be the mild assumption, that
the rm's procedures respect unanimous preferences within the control group. Such rules
would include, inter alia, those which give a major role for management. Note that many
familiar forms of governance can be seen as special cases, for instance producer cooperatives,
1Examples of such procedures would be the Nash bargaining solution used by Hart and Moore (1990), non-
cooperative bargaining, de DeMeza and Lockwood (1998), Bolton and Xu (1999) or the voting models used by
De Marzo (1993), Kelsey and Milne (1996) and Sadanand and Williamson (1991).
2See for instance Geraats and Haller (1998), Hart and Moore (1996) or Renstrom and Yalcin (2003).
3For recent surveys of the governance literature see Allen and Gale (2000), Becht, Bolton, and Roell (2003),
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), and Tirole (2001).
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consumer cooperatives, including worker representatives on the board (as in Germany) and
many types of non-prot organisation. Despite the generality, our model is able to make a
number of predictions concerning equilibrium behaviour and to throw some light on policy
questions.
In a discussion of rm structures, Hansmann (1996) provides many examples of rms
that are cooperatives, partnerships and non-corporate forms. Some are complex non-prot
forms, where the services provided appear to require subtle forms of organisation. Hence it
is desirable that any model of the rm should be exible in abstracting from details that are
specic to particular situations and should deal instead with the decision-making process in
a general way.
Some theories of the rm use bargaining models to determine the relative power of differ-
ent individuals. By varying the bargaining game, it is possible to induce different outcomes to
the management-control mechanism. Although some of these games have some semblance
to reality, we feel they are highly stylized. We prefer to abstract from the details of the
bargaining process and simply assume that whatever the bargaining or management game,
the process leads to an efcient outcome. If one believes that in certain situations, that the
outcome is inefcient, then it would be important to explain the source of the inefciency.
One could think of our model as the outcome of a process to design an efcient mechanism.
If this is infeasible then we are dealing with inefcient mechanisms. As this is an open theo-
retical question, we simply by-pass it by assuming an efcient mechanism exists and explore
the consequences of that assumption.
1.3 Corporate Governance and Imperfect Competition
In oligopolistic markets it is often the case that a rm, which aims to maximise prot, will not
necessarily make the highest prot. If a given rm deviates from prot maximisation, this
can change the behaviour of rivals in ways which give the original rm a strategic advantage.
This was demonstrated by Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987),
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who argue that owners can increase prots by hiring managers on incentive contracts that
reward according to a weighted average of prots and revenues. This makes managers more
aggressive, which can raise prots in Cournot oligopoly.
We relate these arguments to the issues of shareholder voting and monopoly. Consider a
rm that is the sole producer of a particular good. Assume that there is consumer representa-
tion in the control group. We argue that the rm will produce a greater quantity and sell at a
lower price than a conventional prot maximising monopolist. A small price reduction will
result in a second order loss of prots but a rst order gain in their consumer surplus.
In oligopolistic industries there is a similar effect of the rm's governance on price. In
addition, the choice of the rm's constitution can affect the strategic interaction in markets.
Consider a rm in a Cournot oligopoly. Starting at the prot-maximising level, a decrease
in price will lower prots but raise consumer surplus. Different individuals will trade-off
these effects in different ways depending on their shareholdings and consumption patterns.
Suppose a rm gives more weight in its decision procedures to those who have a relatively
greater preference for low prices. Then, ceteris paribus, the rm will charge lower prices
and produce more output. This will cause rivals to reduce their output thus possibly giving
the rm a strategic advantage in the market. Hence increasing inuence of consumers on
decision-making will, up to a point, increase prots.
The above argument implies that there is an optimal form of corporate governance, which
can be derived from considerations of the rm's position in input or product markets. Con-
sider an entrepreneur who designs the constitution of the rm with a view to selling it to
outside investors. Then there is an optimal constitution of the rm, which will maximise its
value. This will only be compatible with prot maximisation in exceptional circumstances.
We investigate how the optimal constitution varies with the number of rms. The deviation
from prot maximisation is greatest when the number of rms is small and tends to zero as
it becomes very large.
We have found that the rm can improve its market position by strategically choosing its
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constitution. Suppose that the rm does not just choose its constitution once but is able to
revise it at any future time. In this case, we obtain a result similar to the Coase conjecture.
Consider a rm which is initially prot maximising. The rm will be tempted to change
its constitution to increase sales and prots. However the new control group will wish to
further amend the constitution to appear more aggressive than it really is. Hence there could
potentially be a whole series of expansions of the control group. The result of this process
is that the rm will nish by losing all market power and producing the competitive level of
output.
Levin and Tadelis (2002) have a related argument. They show that partnerships can be
superior to standard rms in the provision of services. This can happen when the quality of
the service is not observable. As is well known, a partnership will hire less workers than
the corresponding for-prot rm. Where worker ability varies, this results in the partnership
hiring higher quality workers and hence producing a better service. Assume that customers
cannot observe the quality directly, then they will prefer to purchase from partnerships, which
can therefore be more protable. This has a similar structure to the model in the present
paper. In both cases the choice of corporate governance affects the beliefs of other agents.
This causes them to change their behaviour, which indirectly affects the prots of the rm.
Taking into account these indirect effects a conventional rm may not be the most protable.
1.4 General Model
The underlying principles behind these results are demonstrated by an abstract model of
interaction between rms, which we present in Section 6. In this model, rms play a non-
cooperative game where actions are strategic complements or substitutes. In both cases it
may be desirable to give inuence to an outsider who receives an externality from the rm's
strategic variable.
In the rst application we consider Bertrand competition with differentiated goods. We
show that, in this case, it may be desirable to have a degree of overlap between the control
6
groups of two or more rms. To illustrate this point consider two rms competing Bertrand
style. Call them rm 1 and rm 2. Suppose that there are shareholders in rm 2 on the
control group of rm 1. These individuals will have an incentive to raise the price charged
by rm 1 above the prot maximising level, since by doing so they increase the prots of
rm 2. However, up to a point, this can help rm 1. Under Bertrand competition there is a
strategic advantage in committing to a high price since it encourages other rms to raise their
prices. Each rm has an incentive to raise the price charged by the other rm. If both rms
do this, it increases joint prots as it moves the industry closer to a collusive equilibrium.
Thus rm 1 has an incentive to encourage representatives of rival rms into its control group.
As a second application we consider the implications for the governance of universities.
In this case the main inuence is externalities rather than imperfect competition. We argue
that it is desirable to give alumni inuence in the governance of universities. Alumni receive
a positive externality from their university since if the university's reputation increases this
raises the value of their own degree and their career prospects. Thus involving alumni in
university governance serves to commit the to improve quality.4
Organisation of the Paper Section 2 explains our model of rm decisions. Its use is il-
lustrated by considering the price and quantity decisions of a uniform pricing monopolist in
section 3. The effect of the rm's objective function on strategic interaction in markets is
considered in section 4. The case where the rm is allowed to make multiple revisions to its
constitution is modelled in section 5. Section 6 contains the more general model with ap-
plications to Bertrand competition and the governance of universities. Section 7 summarises
our conclusions. The appendix contains proofs of those results not proved in the text.
4See Bowley (2004).
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2 FIRMS
2.1 Prot Maximisation
Economists usually assume that rms maximise prots. However the rm's objective func-
tion should be a derived concept. A rm is a collection of individuals, shareholders, man-
agers, workers, customers etc. The rm's choices come about as a result of maximising
behaviour by these individuals. The usual justication for prot maximisation is the Fisher
Separation Theorem (see Milne (1974), Milne (1981)), which says that if there are no exter-
nalities, the rm has no market power and nancial markets are complete, all shareholders
will wish to maximise the value of the rm.
In the presence of market distortions, it is not typically the case that owners will wish
rms to maximise prots. The Fisher Separation Theorem does not apply if there is imperfect
competition, since in that case, a change in the rm's production plan will affect prices as
well as shareholders' wealth. Firstly, different shareholders will make different trade-offs
between more prots and lower prices. Hence, there will be disagreement between different
shareholders about the policy of the rm. Secondly, typically, no shareholder will wish to
maximise prots. Indeed the concept of prot maximisation is not well dened. Since the
rm's decisions can change relative prices, there is more than one price system which can be
used to measure prots. Other market distortions such as incomplete markets5 or externalities
will create similar problems for the objective function of the rm.
As argued above, in the presence of market distortions, shareholder unanimity cannot
be guaranteed. Figure 2.1 indicates the problem for a monopolist. The diagram shows the
production set for a monopolist who can produce two goods X1 and X2: Since the rm
has monopoly power, the prices will depend on the rm's trade. The diagram shows two
possible production vectors for the rm. These will give rise to two different price systems.
As can be seen from the diagram, individuals A and B have opposite preferences over the
5Similar issues are discussed in the context of incomplete markets in Kelsey and Milne (1996).
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two production plans.
Despite this, it is still the case that there are decisions on which all members of the control
group will agree. For instance, we show that a rm, which has a monopoly, will charge less
than the prot maximising price. Thus conventional prot-maximising models may have
overstated the size of the distortions due to monopoly.
It has been suggested that in addition to shareholders, other parties affected by a rm's
activities should be given inuence in the rm's decisions. These would include inter alia
representatives of workers, customers and the local community. This paper is able to throw
some light on this proposal. Suppose a rm has monopoly power, which cannot be removed
by other means. Our model implies that up to a point, increasing customer inuence on
decisions will reduce distortions. Moreover it could affect competition in the product market.
Similarly increasing worker inuence can be benecial if a rm has monopsony power.
2.2 An Alternative Model of the Firm
We model the rm as a collection of individuals, shareholders, managers, workers and pos-
sibly customers and other stakeholders. Our aim is to relate the rm's objective function to
optimising behaviour by these individuals. The decisions of rm f are assumed to be made
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by a group of individuals C f  f1; :::; Hg, which we shall refer to as the control group of
rm f: The rm's preferences are assumed to be a function of the preferences of the control
group. We do not assume the rm's preferences are complete or transitive, thus avoiding
social choice problems. Note that we do not exclude the possibility that individuals, who
are not shareholders (e.g. managers), are able to inuence the rm's preferences. We shall
not model the internal decision making of the control group explicitly but simply assume
that whatever procedure is used, respects unanimity. Hence, our results do not depend very
sensitively on the composition of the control group.
Assumption 2.1 The rm's decision procedure respects unanimous preferences of the con-
trol group in the sense that if all members of the control group prefer policy a to policy b
with at least one strict preference, then the rm will not choose policy b:
There is a large literature on the theory of the rm, its objectives and implications for
its organization. Some of this assumes a particular objective and explores its implications
for product or factor markets when competing with other rms that are prot maximizing.6
Another related literature tries to derive the rm's objective as an endogenous implication of
a game between players who are either producers or customers of inputs and outputs of the
rm. Often the game is described as either a bargaining game or as some non-cooperative
game between interested parties to a rm-like organisation. This literature can be charac-
terised as setting up a particular model of the rm that emphasises a particular relationship
e.g. human capital acquisition, rm nancing or the acquisition of a specic physical asset
that gives a player an advantage in acting strategically to determine the actions of the rm.7
3 MONOPOLY
In this section we study the implications of our model of the rm for monopolies. Recall
that a prot-maximising monopolist will price according to the inverse elasticity rule, which
6See Askildsen, Ireland, and Law (1988) or Ireland and Stewart (1995) for a sample.
7See Hart (1995), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Allen and Gale (2000), Rajan and Zingales (2000) for a sample.
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says that the mark-up of price over marginal cost is inversely proportional to the elasticity of
demand.
3.1 Price Decisions
Consider a rm which is the sole producer of good x . Let c .x/ denote the cost of producing
quantity x . Let D .p/ denote the demand when the price of monopoly goods is p: The
monopolist's prots are given by  D pD .p/  c .x/ :
Notation 3.1 We shall assume, without loss of generality, that the control group of the mo-
nopolist is fh : 1 6 h 6 Mg :
Assume that members of the control group have quasi-linear utility functions uh D hC
vh .p/ for 1 6 h 6 M: (Individual h has indirect utility function vh for consumption of the
good produced by the rm.) Since the monopolist implements unanimous preferences of the
control group, the optimal point can be obtained by maximising a weighted sum,
PM
hD1 
huh;
of the utilities of the control group for some non-negative weights h:We may normalise the
's by requiring
PM
hD1 
hh D 1:8
A non prot maximising rm chooses p to maximise:
PM
hD1 
huh DPMhD1 hh pD .p/
 PMhD1 h[hcD .p/  vh .p/]: Differentiating with respect to p we obtain, D .p/C p dDdp  
dc
dx
dD
dp C
PM
hD1 
h dvh
dp D 0: By Roy's identity dv
h
dp D  xh; hence, the rst order condition may
be written as:  
p   dcdx

p
D 1

 
1 
MX
hD1
h
xh
x
!
; (1)
where  is the elasticity of demand and xh denotes consumption of good x by individual h.
As can be seen, the price is given by a modied version of the inverse elasticity rule. If the
rm has a single owner-manager, individual i , this can be further simplied to 
p   dcdx

p
D 1


1  x
i
x

: (2)
8This normalisation is possible provided
PM
hD1 hh 6D 0: If this were not satised, the claimants of the
rm's prot stream would be given no inuence over the rm's decisions. We shall not consider this case further,
as we believe it to be of little economic interest.
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If the owner consumes all of the rm's output then the price will be equal to marginal cost,
while if (s)he consumes none of the output, this reduces to the usual pricing formula. In
general, the optimal price is between marginal cost and the prot maximising level. If the
elasticity of demand is constant, then price is lower the greater the owner's consumption of
the monopoly good.
If the control group has multiple members, price is not necessarily equal to marginal
cost, even if they consume all of the rm's output. The price will also depend on the relative
bargaining power of different members of the control group. Those with relatively large
shareholdings and lower consumption will want higher prices. Other things equal, the price
will be lower, the greater the weight given to members of the control group with higher
consumption.9
3.2 Stakeholder Representation
In policy debates on corporate governance it has been argued that rms should not only be
run in the interests of shareholders but also other stakeholders. Our model can be used to
examine this proposal. We interpret a stakeholder to be an individual who owns no shares
but is a worker or consumer. Consider the case where there are two individuals in the control
group. Individual 1 is the sole owner. Individual 2 is a stakeholder who has no ownership
share (hence 2 D 0) but may nevertheless have inuence on decisions.
Our normalisation of the 's implies that 1 D 1; 0 6 2 <1:Under these assumptions,
(1) becomes,
pm   @c@xm
pm
D 1


1  x
1
x
  2 x
2
x

: (3)
Increasing the inuence of stakeholders would correspond to increasing 2. By equation (3)
this will lower the price of the monopoly good. Hence if competition is impossible, a rm
9The problem of a monopolist with some consumers in the control group has been previously considered by
Farrell (1985), who assumed unanimity as the rm's decision rule or Hart and Moore (1996) and Renstrom and
Yalcin (2003), who used the median voter rule. Our results are more general since we do not restrict attention to
a specic decision procedure.
12
with some stakeholder representation would be preferable to a prot-maximising monopo-
list. However, if the power of stakeholders is made too great, price could be reduced below
marginal cost, which would be inefcient. In this case, stakeholders would be using their
inuence to make inefcient transfers from the owners to themselves.
Assume x1m C x2m D xm i.e. there are no consumers other than the owners and the stake-
holders. A social planner would aim to set price equal to marginal cost, i.e. pm D @c@xm : By
equation (3) this implies 1   x1x   2 x
2
x D 0; which can be solved to give 2 D 1: Hence
the rm should maximise the unweighted sum of utility of shareholders and stakeholders.
In practice, this could be implemented by voting over price and giving an equal number of
votes to shareholders and stakeholders. In this case, the median voter would choose to set
price equal to marginal cost.
3.3 Monopsony
Our theory so far has emphasised imperfect competition in the product market and the in-
volvement of consumers in rms' decisions. However similar reasoning applies if some input
markets are imperfectly competitive. This would provide a justication for giving input sup-
pliers a special role in decisions. A common example is where the rm is owned by suppliers
of a particular form of labour. It is not uncommon for rms to face imperfect competition in
the labour market. The market for labour is often thin. This analysis would also apply if other
input markets are imperfectly competitive. Another example is farm marketing cooperatives,
which buy the output of farms on imperfectly competitive markets.
We can apply similar reasoning to that used for monopoly. Hence we can reinterpret
the rst order conditions replacing monopoly with monopsony and demand elasticity with
supply elasticity. If there is more than one owner, the price of the input will be between
the competitive level and the monopsony level, depending upon the inuence of suppliers
in the control group. In other words, the monopsony distortion is moderated by the inu-
ence of suppliers, and in turn the inefciency is moderated by including the supplier of the
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monopsony input.
When there is more than one monopsony input, the situation is only a little more com-
plicated. Now the quantity of each monopsony input will be determined by the multi-good
monopsony pricing rule. Other things equal, the more elastic the supply then the closer the
pricing rule approximates the competitive rule and the less importance there is in including
the supplier in the control group. In the limit where the supply is perfectly elastic, the sup-
plier plays no effective role in the control decision. Conversely, the more inelastic the supply,
the more important the supplier is in affecting the production and input pricing rule.
4 COURNOT OLIGOPOLY
We now consider oligopolistic markets. Most of our analysis of monopoly can be extended
to this case. For instance, if those in charge of the rm are, in part, consumers the price will
be below the prot maximising level. In addition the constitution of the rm affects strategic
interaction in markets. Giving greater representation to individuals who are relatively high
consumers of the product is a means to committing to a large output. This is an advantage in
Cournot oligopoly. In effect it makes a Cournot oligopolist more like a Stackleberg leader.
Hence if there are distortions in the labour and/or product markets, other forms of corporate
governance may be superior to conventional prot-maximising rms.
4.1 Model
Consider a Cournot oligopoly with n rms, which can produce at constant marginal and
average cost c: For simplicity we assume a linear inverse demand curve p D 1  PniD1 xi ;
where xi denotes the output of rm i:
We assume that there are two types of individuals, type A and type B. Type A individuals
do not consume the industry's output and uA D  A A:10 Type B individuals care both about
10Since there is no uncertainty, there is no serious loss of generality in assuming that the utility of type A
individuals is linear in income.
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income and consumption of the output. Consequently they have (indirect) utility functions
uB D  B BCvB .px/ ;where  t denotes total prot income accruing to an individual of type
t:We consider the case where the rm has a control group which consists of two members.
One of type A and one of type B: The type A individual is assumed to own all of the equity.
Thus the utility of the type A (resp. B) individual may be written as uA D  A D px   c xi ;
(resp. uB D vB .px/). The same individual is not represented in the control group of more
than one rm. Our normalisation of the 's implies A D 1; 0 6 B 61:
As in the previous section, the decisions of the rm may be represented as maximising
uA C Bi uB; after normalisation. We write i for Bi . We consider the following 2-stage
game. In the rst period, the owners choose i to maximise the value of the rm. In the
second stage, rms compete in quantities Cournot-style. We look for a subgame perfect
equilibrium of the 2-stage game.
Proposition 4.1 In an n rm oligopoly the reaction function of rm i is given by
xi D
1  c C i x B  
P
j 6Di x j

2
: (4)
Proof. Firm i maximises:  i D uACiuB D
h
1  c  PnjD1 x ji xiCivB 1 PnjD1 x j :
The rst order condition for optimal choice of xi is: 1  c  PnjD1 x j   xi   ivB0 D 0: By
Roy's identity vB0 D  x B; hence, 1  c PnjD1 x j   xi  i x B D 0:11 The result follows.
The higher i the greater the inuence given to individual B. The proposition implies
that, ceteris paribus, an increase in i will increase xi : This makes rm i more aggressive,
which is advantageous in a game of strategic substitutes. Firms with a larger value of i
will produce higher output in equilibrium. A possible example of this can be found Refsell
(1914), who shows that cooperative grain elevators expanded their output signicantly at the
expense of for-prot rivals in the period 1903-1913.
11We assume that the rm takes xB (the consumption of good x by a type-B individual) as given when choos-
ing its output.
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Proposition 4.2 Let `n denote the value of i in a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium
with n rms. Then `n is given by
`n D .n   1/ .1  c/ n2 C 1 x B :
This shows that the optimal value of  tends to 0 as n tends to innity. The more com-
petitive the market is, the closer rms should stick to prot maximisation. Given that n is
restricted to take integer values, the maximum value of `n occurs at n D 2 or 3: Thereafter
`n is strictly decreasing in n: The analysis requires n > 2 to be economically meaningful.
This is intuitive, as n increases the market distortion decreases, thus there is less scope for
strategic behaviour. Hence the strategic effect of the rm's governance is likely to be greatest
when the number of rms is small and declines as the market becomes more competitive.
These results generalise. Whenever Cournot oligopoly is a game of strategic substitutes,
prot can be raised by giving some inuence to consumers. Our results do not depend cru-
cially on assumptions about the preferences of the different individuals. Similar results could
be obtained if a rm were owned by a number of individuals who have different preferences
between consumption and prots. By adjusting the decision weights of these individuals, the
rm can commit to a more or less aggressive policy in the product market. This is demon-
strated by the results in section 6, in which a more general form of preferences is used.12
4.2 Optimal Constitution of the Firm
In this section we consider two ways to endogenise the constitution of the rm. The constitu-
tion of the rm can be made endogenous by assuming that it is designed by an entrepreneur
to maximise the value of the rm. Only in exceptional circumstances would (s)he would
choose prot maximisation. Alternatively the constitution of the rm could be designed by
a social planner to maximise welfare.
12Dierker and Grodal (1996) have a result which is almost the reverse of this. They show that under Bertrand
competition owners have higher utility if they delegate the running of the rm to a manager with an incentive to
maximise prots than if they directly run the rm themselves.
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4.2.1 Social Planner
Suppose that the constitution of the rm is chosen by the social planner to maximise the sum
of consumer and producer surplus. We assume that for each rm f the  f is chosen by the
social planner. Let n denote the social planner's optimal value of  f in an n rm industry.
The social planner is not however able to intervene directly in the markets to make them
more competitive or to set prices.
Proposition 4.3 If the constitutions of the rms are chosen to maximise total surplus n D
1 c
nx21
:
Proof. Consider a symmetric equilibrium with n rms. Each rm has  f D n and produces
output xn : From equation (7), xn D 1n
 
1  c   xn C nx21

: Solving,
.n C 1/ xn D 1  c C nx21 : (5)
As usual, the social planner will choose to produce where price equals marginal cost, hence,
xn D 1 cn : Substituting into (5), we obtain nC1n .1  c/ D 1 cCnx21 ; from which the result
follows:
Assume all consumers are represented in the rm, then x21 D 1 cn . Substituting into
equation (5) we nd n D 1: This implies that shareholders and stakeholders should be given
equal inuence over the rm's decisions. Recall we found a similar result for a monopoly.
From the social planner's point of view, the optimal constitution does not depend on the
number of rms in the industry.
4.2.2 Entrepreneur
Now suppose that an entrepreneur designs the constitution of the rm to maximise the value
at which he can sell it. If the organisation is sold as a prot maximising rm, the price
achieved will only be the Cournot oligopoly prots. Higher prots can be made by selling
the rm if it has the optimal degree of consumer representation. In this case the entrepreneur
will receive the prots of a Stackleberg leader.
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Equally if the problem is not one of designing a constitution from scratch, then in a
Cournot duopoly, a rm can increase its prots to the Stackleberg level by giving representa-
tion to consumers. The market for corporate control may have a similar effect. If the rm did
not initially have the optimal form of corporate governance then an outsider could protably
buy up the shares and reorganise the rm. Subsequently the rm could be re-sold at a prot.
4.3 Input Markets
Similar arguments can be used if the rm faces imperfectly competitive input markets. If
rms compete in quantities Cournot-style in the labour market, then the rm's strategic po-
sition may be improved by giving workers or their representatives inuence in decision-
making. We believe that imperfect competition may be more important in input markets than
in output markets. This is because labour markets are often highly specialised both by skill
and by location. In professions such as law, medicine and education, it is common for some
or all suppliers of labour to have more inuence than in conventional investor-owned rms.
These rms typically require highly specialised labour and face thin markets for this labour.
For instance in the UK, there are only 9 paediatric rheumatologists. Clearly with such small
numbers competition is not possible. In these circumstances, it may be in the interest of the
rm's owners to give shares to workers or other individuals with an interest in increasing
labour demand. (Assuming that these individuals could be prevented from re-selling.)13
5 EQUILIBRIUM CONSTITUTION OF THE FIRM
As argued in previous sections, if the founder of a rm wishes to maximise prot it is in
his/her interest to choose the constitution of the rm strategically. This is equally true when
the other rms do not maximise prot. Whenever the rival rms have a downward slop-
ing reaction function, prot can be increased by adopting a constitution, which commits the
13Roberts and Steen (2000) have made a similar point. It may be in the interest of a rm to give shares to its
workers to encourage investment in rm-specic human capital.
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rm to behaving more aggressively. Likewise, the result does not depend crucially on the
original objective of the rm. For instance, suppose a consumer cooperative aims to max-
imise a weighted average of consumer surplus and prots. Such a rm could better achieve
its objective by committing to a more aggressive strategy. This would up to a point raise
prots and increase consumer surplus because of the strategic effect on other rms' output.
Hence increasing the cooperative's objective, provided it gives some weight to prots. More
generally as long as the current control group gives positive weight to prots, it is in their
interest to adopt a constitution which commits the rm to behaving more aggressively than
they would choose themselves.
This suggests an alternative way to endogenise the constitution of the rm. We can dene
the equilibrium constitution of the rm to be such that there is no strategic reason to change
the constitution according to the objective of the rm as dened in the constitution itself.
This is intended as a theory of the objective function of the rm in a long run equilibrium, in
which all possible adjustments have been made.
We obtain a result similar to the Coase conjecture. Consider a rm which is initially
prot maximising. The rm will be tempted to change its constitution to increase sales and
prots. However if the rm cannot commit to prevent further changes to the constitution,
there could be a series of changes each of which increases the rm's current objective when
it was implemented. The result of this process is that the rm will nish by producing the
competitive level of output. Unlike the Coase analysis, it is not essential for our argument
that the rm's output be durable.
If, instead of giving inuence away, the original owner sold inuence then the process
may even be in the interest of the original owner. Individuals who consume the rm's output
are always prepared to pay an amount equal to his/her increase in consumer surplus. Up
to the Stackleberg point, the owner gets an indirect benet from selling inuence via the
strategic effect on prots.
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5.1 Model
There are 2 rms, rm 1 and rm 2, which compete Cournot style. For simplicity, we assume
a linear inverse demand curve p D 1  x1   x2: Firm 2 is a conventional prot-maximising
rm. Firm 1 has two members in the control group, one type A individual and one type of
B. Recall type A (resp. B) individuals have utilities uA D 1; (resp. uB D vB .p/).
We impose a non-negative prot condition. There are two reasons for this. Firstly as
price falls below marginal cost, all other rms, which are assumed to be maximising prot,
would exit from the industry. Thus issues of strategic delegation would no longer be relevant.
Secondly since the model is intended as one of long run equilibrium. The rm would not
be viable in the long run if it makes losses. The non-negative prot condition can also be
justied since limited liability implies that owners cannot be forced to contribute additional
funds to the enterprise.
Assumption 5.1 Firms cannot make losses.
This implies that, price must be greater than or equal to marginal cost, p > c: The
following result demonstrates that, in an equilibrium in which the rm does not wish to
change its constitution, price will equal marginal cost.
Proposition 5.1 Under Assumption 5.1, the only equilibrium constitution is where B D
B D 1 cx B ; x1 D 1  c and p D c:
This implies that, in the absence of commitment, the rm will increasingly delegate more
power to consumers' representatives.
5.2 Discussion
We have argued that by a process of successive strategic delegation, a rm can become taken-
over by its customers. At rst sight this may appear implausible. However we believe this
story does capture some aspects of reality. Firstly it should be noted that a customer may be
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another rm. There are documented cases in which upstream rms have been taken over by
downstream rms, including the well-known takeover of Fisher Body by General Motors.
Another example is the purchase by farmers of rms which supply inputs (e.g. fertilizer) to
farms, see Hansmann (1996) and Refsell (1914).
An analogous story could be told in terms of imperfectly competitive input markets. The
conclusion would be that successive rounds of delegation would hand control to suppliers,
who would bid more aggressively in the input market. In this case we would see the suppliers
of inputs would eventually take over the rm. If the input is top-level management, there is
evidence that such a takeover has indeed happened, see Roe (1994).
An alternative way to interpret this result is that rms will have incentives to adopt de-
vices, which preclude too much strategic delegation to prevent loss of control. Firms do
indeed adopt different procedures for different kinds of decisions. Pricing and output de-
cisions are usually made by mangers, while mergers and takeovers require the approval of
shareholders.
The initial controlling group has an interest to commit to no further strategic delegation
after the rst stage. If such commitment is not possible, then a far-sighted owner may not
permit the rst round of strategic delegation foreseeing that it will trigger a whole series of
successive delegations, which will ultimately have the effect of reducing his/her prot.14
6 EXTENSIONS
In previous sections we have shown that giving inuence to consumer representatives can be
a good strategy under Cournot competition. Here we show this can be generalised to a more
14A related result can be found in Baye, Crocker, and Ju (1996). They show that rms in Cournot oligopoly
have an incentive to divide themselves into competing divisions. The benet of divisionalisation is that it has a
strategic effect on the output of rivals. As the cost of creating new divisions tends to zero, price converges to
marginal cost. Again lack of commitment can lead to excessive divisionalisation and a complete loss of market
power.
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abstract model of competition, where rms' actions may be either strategic complements or
substitutes. In both cases it may be desirable to give inuence to an outsider who receives an
externality from the rm's strategic variable. As an application we show that under Bertrand
competition is it desirable to give some inuence to representatives of competitor rms. This
provides a possible rationale for systems of cross shareholdings and directorships seen in cer-
tain industries and in certain countries. In a second application we consider the implications
for the governance of universities.
6.1 A More General Model
There are n rms. Firm i chooses a strategic variable xi from its strategy set X i ; which
we assume to be a closed interval in R: The prots of rm 1 are given by Q1 .x1; x 1/ D
1 .x1;  .x 1// ; where  : X 1 ! R; is increasing. Thus the prots of rm 1 depend on
its own action and a 1-dimensional aggregate of the actions of its rivals. We assume that
111 < 0; hence rm 1's prot is a concave function of its own strategy. Let R .x1/ denote
the best response of rm 1's rivals, which is assumed to be unique.15
The control group of rm 1 potentially consists of m C 1 individuals, 0 6 i 6 m:
Individual 0 is only concerned about the prots he receives from rm 0. He/she has utility
function u0
 
0

: For 1 6 i 6 n; individual i has utility function ui
 
1; x1

: We assume
that ui22 < 0: As in previous sections, rm 0 may be represented as maximising,
Pm
iD0 
iui ;
for some weights i :
We consider the following 2-stage game. First rm 1 chooses the i 's. In the second
stage, all rms choose their strategic variables simultaneously and independently.
Proposition 6.1 An optimal value of the 's is to set i D 0; i 6D 0; jI
0 D 1  
1
2
0R0 .x1/
@u j
@x1
@u j
@1
@u0
@1
;  j D 
1
2
0R0 .x1/
@u j
@x1
: (6)
15This could be justied by assuming that the rivals' objective functions are strictly concave in their own
strategies.
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Note that this result does not assume that rival rms are maximising prot. Nor indeed is
it necessary that rm 1's objective is prot maximisation. Incentive compatibility implies that
it will be not be possible to implement a negative value of  j : However if some individuals
receive positive externalities from the rm's strategic variable, while others receive negative
externalities there will always be an appropriate kind of outsider who can be given inuence.
As an example consider a Cournot duopoly where rms' quantities are strategic substi-
tutes, hence R0 < 0: In this case an increase in output by one rm reduces prots at all of
its rivals hence 12 < 0: Thus provided individual j gets a positive externality (i.e.
@u j
@x1
> 0)
from rm 1's strategic variable, the optimum can be implemented with a positive value of
 j : A consumer is likely to receive a positive externality if a rm in an imperfectly compet-
itive industry expands output. Thus this conrms our earlier result about the desirability of
consumer representation in Cournot oligopoly.
If m > 1; the optimal values of the 's are not unique, since the rst order conditions
are linearly dependent. This result shows that the optimum may be achieved by a relatively
simple constitution for the rm. The control group need consist of only two individuals, one
of which is only interested in prot. The other has either positive or negative externalities (as
appropriate) from the rm's strategic variable.
6.2 Price Competition
6.2.1 Model
This section is concerned with what happens when the control groups of two rms overlap.
Hence the same individual has inuence over the decisions of two or more rms. We show
that if rms produce differentiated goods and compete Bertrand style, it is desirable to have
representatives from rival rms in the control group. If rms compete in prices there is a
strategic advantage to committing to higher prices. Overlapping control groups provides one
way to do this.
If rms compete in prices, the strategic variables will usually be strategic complements.
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In this case R0 > 0 and 12 > 0: Thus equation (6) implies that it is desirable to share
inuence with an individual who gets a positive externality from the rm's strategic variable,
@u j
@x1
> 0: To illustrate this consider two rms, i D 1; 2; which produce differentiated goods
at zero average and marginal cost. We assume that rm i faces a linear demand curve:
Di .pi ; p j / D maxf0; a C p j   cpi g; a; c > 0; c > 1; where pi denotes the price of rm
i: There are two types of individuals, type A and type C . Both types do not consume the
industry output but can own shares in the rms. In particular uA D 1 and uC D 2. As
before we may represent the objective of rm 1 (resp. 2) as maximising uA C 1uC (resp.
uC C 2uA): The interpretation is that by including a type C individual in the control group
of rm 1, we are giving inuence to an individual who is, in some sense, a representative of
rm 2.
Firms play a two-stage game, where in the rst stage they choose the degree of inuence
given to a representative of the other rm, i ; and in the second stage the rms compete
Bertrand-style in prices. The following result nds the price in a sub-game perfect equilib-
rium where both rms use the same :
Proposition 6.2 In a symmetric equilibrium where both rms choose the degree of outsider
representation, the value of  is given by:
 D 1
2c   1 :
As c increases products become more differentiated and hence the equilibrium  de-
creases. The less products are differentiated, the more representation is given to owners of
the other rm. When products are less differentiated competition is more intense. This in-
creases the desirability of softening competition by giving representation to the owners of
the other rm. If c D 1; the market is a Bertrand oligopoly with homogenous goods. In
this case the optimal  is 1. This implies that both rms maximise the sum of their prots.
The limiting case where c ! 1 corresponds to two independent monopolists operating on
unrelated demand curves. In this case the optimal  is 0; since when there is no relation
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between the demand curves, there is no advantage to involving owners of the other rm in
the control group.
6.2.2 Discussion
There are a number of examples of situations where the same economic agent may have
inuence in two or more rms pursuing related lines of business. Visa and Mastercard have
an effective duopoly over credit cards. They are controlled by the member banks. Many
banks are members of both systems hence have some inuence over the running of both
credit card systems. Links between control groups are very common in the car and airline
industries. Industrial groups, as seen in Japan and Korea, may also be in part motivated by
the effects discussed in this section. It is clear from recent empirical work that interlocking
ownership plays a major role in oligopolistic industries in many countries. For instance
Mork, Stangeland, and Yeung (2000) show that pyramidal control structures are common in
a number of countries such as Canada, Japan and Germany. Even in the USA, overlapping
directorships are not unknown.
The practices described in this section are clearly collusive. Public policy should try to
discourage them. In this paper we assume that there is no regulation. However our results
make a good case why regulation is desirable.
6.3 Universities
As a second example , we argue our framework can help to understand the governance of uni-
versities, especially private universities. Many universities involve alumni, especially promi-
nent donors in their decision making.16 We argue that, under some reasonable assumptions,
this is a prediction of our theory.
Assume that increasing the quality of one university will increase both the marginal and
16In Oxford and Cambridge all MA's have voting rights on a number of key issues. (Including the election
of the Oxford Professor of poetry.) Since all graduates are entitled to an MA ve years after graduating there is
very widespread alumni involvement.
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total benet of raising quality in other universities. (It seems reasonable to assume that
these effects are stronger at universities which are geographically close.) This means both
that there are positive externalities between neighbouring universities and there is strategic
complementarity in the sense that improving the quality of one university will increase the
incentives to improve quality at nearby universities.17 One reason for this is that there is a
positive effect of competition. An improvement in the quality of a nearby university sets a
higher benchmark for performance at the home institution. Another might be that increases
in quality at other universities improves the pool from which research collaborators and new
faculty can be drawn.18 Evidence for strategic complementarity between neighbouring uni-
versities is provided by the fact that universities tend to concentrated in certain regions, Paris,
the London area, and the Boston area being leading examples.
Consider equation (6), interpret the rms as universities and xi to be the quality of univer-
sity i: If there are positive externalities between different universities then 12 > 0; strategic
complementarity implies R0 > 0: Equation (6) implies it is desirable to give inuence in uni-
versity governance to an individual for which @u j
@x1
> 0; i.e. an individual who gets positive
externalities from the quality of the university. We shall argue that the common practice of
involving alumni in university governance is an example.
Alumni receive positive externalities from the quality of their own universities, since
improvements in quality will increase the prestige of their own degrees and hence their career
prospects. Thus alumni involvement serves as commitment device to increase the quality of
the university. Alumni are used rather than current students since the quality of programmes
may only become apparent after a period of time. In addition alumni have greater incentives
17It can reasonably be objected that the quality of a university is not adequately measured by a single real
number. However we note that multi-dimensional theories of strategic complementarity exist (see Milgrom and
Roberts (1990), Milgrom and Shannon (1994)) hence we remain condent that our results would still hold in a
more realistic setting where we allow for multiple aspects of quality.
18There may also be some more direct externalities if there is cross teaching between nearby universities
especially joint PhD programmes.
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to maintain standards than current students. Thus when there are positive externalities and
strategic complementarity, increasing alumni involvement increases the quality of a given
university and all other universities. The outcome will be Pareto superior compared to the
Nash equilibrium where both rms are maximising prot. If there are multiple equilibria,
high alumni involvement can act as a selection device moving the university system to a
higher level equilibrium.
There is a second advantage of alumni involvement in university governance. Assume
that potential students may not observe university quality directly. Instead the quality of ed-
ucation only gradually becomes apparent after graduation through its effect on the quality of
life and career prospects. Alumni involvement may act as a commitment device to maintain
quality. Potential students can observe the organisation of the university and hence would be
attracted to a university with a high degree of alumni involvement.
A more complex model would take into account the fact that universities are engaged
in both teaching and research. Both faculty and alumni are actively engaged in the running
of universities. This may be explained by postulating that faculty get positive externalities
from the quality of research and that there is strategic complementarity between teaching and
research.
Our model of a university should be seen as a generalisation of the Glaeser and Shleifer
(2001), and Glaeser (2003) model of a non-prot organization. In Glaeser (2003) there are
many examples of non-prot rms explored e.g. hospitals, art museums and universities.
Their model has a rm that produces output and a quality attribute. The rm is controlled by
a manager who maximises utility, but can be inuenced by the actions of workers. Clearly
this model can be seen as a version of our model where university reputation is the quality
attribute and the manager and worker (academic faculty) inuence is just a special case of
our control group. We have stressed the role of the alumni acting in the control group, but it
is easy to extend the model to include other groups. An additional advantage of our model
is that we allow more general market structures - the case of a competitive market with for-
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prot competitors is just a special case.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper we have argued that a number of apparently unrelated issues in the governance
of organisations can be explained as responses to market distortions. These include but are
not limited to the use of professional partnerships, farm marketing cooperatives and the role
of alumni in university governance. In particular, in the presence of imperfect competition
appropriate choice of corporate governance can reduce market distortions and/or shift the
equilibrium in the favour of a given rm. Moreover the general model shows that simi-
lar considerations apply to other market distortions. Our conclusions are supported by the
evidence in Hansmann (1996).
According to our arguments when there is monopoly or Cournot-style competition there
are incentives for increased consumer involvement in the governance of rms. Clearly this
does not happen in all instances of monopoly or imperfect competition. We conjecture that
is because the costs to consumers of organising varies between different rms. An important
factor, which affects the costs of organisation is geographical distance. If customers live
close together they can meet and organise more cheaply. Thus the customers of a grain
elevator can organise relatively cheaply since they are relatively small in numbers and live
close together compared to the customers of Microsoft.
A second, possibly more important, cost of organising is the cost of collective decisions.
All systems of collective choice impose costs, both direct costs of operating the mechanism
and indirect costs if the outcome of the mechanism is inefcient. Costs of collective decisions
are greater the more diverse the preferences of the group of individuals making the decision.
This provides a second reason why the customers of a grain elevator are able to organise,
while the customers of Microsoft are not. Microsoft customers are much more diverse which
means that they are more likely to suffer from the various problems of voting such as the
well known Condorcet paradox. For further discussion see Hansmann (1996) pp. 39-44.
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Our arguments imply that, in general, consumer representation increases prots in Cournot
competition and representation from rival rms increases prots under Bertrand competition.
This suggests that we would expect to see different patterns of organisation of rms under
the two types of competition. This hypothesis can, in principle, be tested.
We believe an advantage of our model is that it provides an endogenous theory of cor-
porate governance. This can be done in three ways, the rm's constitution could be chosen
by an entrepreneur to maximise the value at which the rm can be sold; the rm's constitu-
tion could be chosen by those currently controlling the rm to maximise their objectives or
the system of corporate governance could be chosen by a social planner to maximise social
welfare. Although a number of suggestions have been made, at present economics lacks a
well established theory of corporate governance. All three proposals have validity beyond
the present context.
More generally we believe that there needs to be a rethinking of many results from indus-
trial organisation to allow for more detailed modelling of the internal organisation of the rm.
As an example consider management buy-outs (MBO's). Much of the existing literature has
used an agency theoretic approach. It is argued that their main benet is improved incentives
for management. In the present paper we argue that the changes in corporate governance can
affect a rm's position in the product and/or labour markets. The main effect of an MBO is
to transfer control of the rm from investors to suppliers of managerial labour. If the man-
agerial labour market is imperfectly competitive this could have the effect of improving the
rm's strategic position in that market.
A possible direction for the future is that skilled labour will become more important.
This would shift the bargaining power within organisations. In the rm of the future it is
possible that capital will be hired by a coalition of skilled workers. The model in the present
paper may help us to understand such changes.
APPENDIX
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A OLIGOPOLY
This appendix contains proofs of our results on oligopoly.
A.1 Cournot Model
Proof of Proposition 4.2 We shall look for a symmetric equilibrium where all rms
use the same value of  D `n and produce the same output, Ox : Using equation (4) we nd,
Ox D 1 c .n 1/ OxC`nx B2 : Solving, nC12 Ox D 1 cC`nx
B
2 : Hence equilibrium output is given by,
Ox D 1 cC`nx BnC1 :
We shall now look for the Stackleberg equilibrium, in which rm i is the leader and the
outputs of the other rms lie on the equilibrium reaction function:
x i D n   1n
 
1  c   xi C `nx B

; (7)
where x i D P j 6Di x j denotes the total output of all rms other than i: Firm i's prot
is given by,  i D .1  c   x i   xi / xi : Substituting from the reaction function,  i D  1
n .1  c/  n 1n `nx B   1n xi

xi : The rst order condition is, .1  c/ .n   1/ `nx B 2xi D
0: Hence rm i's Stackleberg output is, xi D .1 c/ .n 1/`nx B2 :
The level of i ; which maximises rm i's prot, is achieved where the equilibrium out-
put is equal to the Stackleberg output. Hence 1 cC`nx
B
nC1 D .1 c/ .n 1/`nx
B
2 : Solving for `n :
2 .1  c/C 2`nx B D .1  c/ .n C 1/ 
 
n2   1 `nx B or  n2 C 1 `nx B D .1  c/ .n   1/ ;
from which the result follows.
Lemma A.1 In a Cournot duopoly where rm 2 maximises prot, the market equilibrium is
given by,
Nx1 D 1  c C 2
Bx B
3
; Nx2 D 1  c   
Bx B
3
; Np D 1C 2c   
Bx B
3
: (8)
Proof. By Proposition 4.1, the reaction function of rm 1 (resp. 2) is given by x1 D
.1 c x2/CB x B
2 ; (resp. x2 D .1 c x1/2 ). Solving in the usual way we obtain, Nx1 D 1 cC2
B x B
3
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and Nx2 D 1 c B x B3 : The equilibrium price is given by, Np D 1   1 cC2
B x B
3   1 c 
B x B
3 D
1C2c B x B
3 :
Proof of Proposition 5.1 To check B D B is indeed an equilibrium. If B D NB
then from (8) the equilibrium quantity and price will be x1 D 1  c and p D c:
As before, we may represent the rm's objective as:  1 D 1 C NBvB D 19 .1  c/2
C 19

.1  c/ Bx B   2B2x B2

C NBvB

1C2c B x B
3

forB; NB 6 1 cx B :19 From the point
of view of the equilibrium constitution, the effect of a change in B on the rm's objec-
tive is given by d 1dB D 19

.1  c/ x B   4Bx B2

C 13 N
Bx B2 : Note that the initial value
of B , NB is treated as constant for this differentiation. The second order condition is
satised: Evaluating at B D B; d 1dB

BDB
D 19

.1  c/ x B   4 1 cx B x B
2

C 13 1 cx B x B
2 D
1
9
 
.1  c/ x B   4 .1  c/ x B C 13 .1  c/ x B D 0; which establishes that B D B; is an
optimum and hence that the rm would not want to decrease B below B :
The rm has no incentive to increase B; since it is already supplying the entire market.
Firm 2's output is zero, hence there is no strategic effect of further reductions in B : The
only effect of reducing B further would be to cause the rm to increase its output beyond
the current level. This is not desirable as the current level is already optimal according to the
current objective function.
Uniqueness. Assume NB < 1 cx B : Then d 1dB

BDB
D 19

.1  c/ x B   4 Nx B2

C 13 N
Bx B D
x B
9

.1  c/C NB  3  4x B :
If we assume x B 6 34 then it is clear that
d 1
dB

BDB
> 0: If x B > 34 ;
d 1
dB

BDB
>
x B
9
 
.1  c/C 1 cx B
 
3  4x B D .1 c/3  1  x B > 0; since x B < 1: This implies that if
NB < 1 cx B there is a strategic advantage to increasing B . Hence B < 1 cx B is not compatible
with equilibrium.
If NB > 1 cx B ; price would be below marginal cost and hence would not satisfy the non-
negative prot constraint. Consequently such values of NB would not be sustainable in long
run equilibrium.
19This is the point at which the rival exits the market, which causes the prot function to be non-differentiable.
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A.2 General Model
Proposition 6.1 An optimal value of the 's is to set i D 0; i 6D 0; jI
0 D 1  
1
2
0R0 .x1/
@u j
@x1
@u j
@1
@u0
@1
;  j D 
1
2
0R0 .x1/
@u j
@x1
: (9)
Proof of Proposition 6.1 If rm 1 can act as a Stackleberg leader, its prot will be given
by, 1 .x1;  .R .x1/// : The rst order condition for maximising this is:
11 C 120 .R .x1// R0 .x1/ D 0: (10)
Firm 1's actual rst order condition is,
Pm
iD0 
i @ui
@1
11 C i @u
i
@x1
D 0: Assume that i D
0; unless i D 0 or i D j: This simplies to 0 @u0
@1
11 C  j @u
j
@1
11 C  j @u
j
@x1
D 0: The 's
are only unique upto positive scalar multiple. Hence we may normalise them by requiring
0 @u
0
@1
C  j @u j
@1
D 1: This simplies the rst order condition to
11 C  j
@u j
@x1
D 0: (11)
Comparing (10) and (11) we see that if
 j
@u j
@x1
D 120R0 .x1/ ; (12)
the rm can obtain prots as if it were a Stackleberg leader. Since this sets an upper bound
to the prots rm 1 can make in the second stage, it follows that this is the optimal value for
 j : Solving for 0; we obtain 0 D 1   j
@u j
@1
@u0
@1
D 1  120R0.x1/
@u j
@x1
@u j
@1
@u0
@1
:
The following results apply to the model of price competition from Section 6.2.
Lemma A.2 In a symmetric Bertrand equilibrium where A2 D C1 D ; prices are given by
Op D a2c .C1/ :
Proof. Firm 1's objective is to maximise: uACC1 uC D p1 .a C p2   cp1/CC1 p2 .a C p1   cp2/ :
The rst order condition is: a C p2   2cp1 C C1 bp2 D 0: Thus rm 1's reaction curve is
given by,
p1 D a C
 
C1 C 1

p2
2c
: (13)
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Let Op denote the symmetric equilibrium price, where both rms use the same : This satisesh
2c .C1/
2c
i
Op D a2c ; from which the result follows.
Lemma A.3 Assume that rm 1 maximises prot, while rm 2 gives weight A2 to type A
individuals in its decisions. Suppose that rm 1 is a price leader, then its optimal price is
given by:
Qp1 D a .2c C 1/2 2c2    A2 C 1 :
Proof. From equation (13) and symmetry, rm 2's reaction function is given by: p2 D
a
2c C .
A2 C1/p1
2c : Firm 1's prots are given by: 1 D p1

a C a2c C .
A2 C1/p1
2c   cp1

: The rst
order condition for prot maximisation is:
d1
dp1
D
 
a C a
2c
C
 
A2 C 1

p1
c
  2cp1
!
D 0: (14)
Hence 2ca C a C 2  A2 C 1  2c2 p1 D 0; from which the result follows.20
Proposition 6.2 In a symmetric equilibrium where both rms choose the degree of out-
sider representation, the value of  is given by:  D 12c 1 :
Proof of Proposition 6.2 At the optimum  the price leader's price is equal to the
equilibrium price: a.2cC1/2[2c2 .C1/] D a2c .C1/ : Cross-multiplying: .2c C 1/ [2c   .C 1/] D
2

2c2   .C 1/ : Expanding, 4c2 C 2c   2c   2c   .C 1/ D 4c2   2 .C 1/ ; hence
2c D C 1 or 1 D  .2c   1/ ; from which the result follows.
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